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Introduction 
Over the past decade Australian local government has been subjected to drastic 
policy-induced changes that have substantially altered its nature and form (Marshall, 
et al., 1999). Chapman (1997) has identified two broad phases for contemporary 
local government in Australia. Firstly, “the period between 1970 and 1985…saw the 
major and continuous change for local government in its functional responsibilities, 
in the level of expenditure not covered by rates and borrowings, in the demand 
placed on its professional officers, and in the need for councillors to be adaptable and 
change attitudes to their task” (Chapman 1997, p. 49). Secondly, after a brief respite, 
a new phase of reform began in the early 1990s, which emphasised a broad program 
of microeconomic reform, including national benchmarking and national competition 
policy. This second phase has continued more or less unabated regardless of the 
political complexions of state and Commonwealth governments. Indeed, in the early 
days of its period in office, the new Howard administration reiterated its commitment 
to the ongoing reform of Australian local government repeatedly. For instance, the 
then Commonwealth Minister for Local Government, Warwick Smith (1996, p. 1), 
noted in his address the National General Assembly of the Australian Local 
Government Association on 3 December 1996 that: 
All governments must anticipate and react to continual change and respond to 
rising pressures from the community, business and government sectors to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of their services. Local government is 
no exception. 
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The Minister went on to identify the nature of the reforms envisaged by the 
Commonwealth government. These included regulatory reform, benchmarking and 
performance indicators, competitive tendering and contracting, competition policy, 
and restructuring. Not only has the Commonwealth government pursued these 
policies vigorously, but is has also added significant new reform programs, such as 
workplace reform.  
The sheer pace of reform in Australian local government has made it difficult for 
practitioners and scholars alike to document and evaluate the changes that have taken 
place. For example, even comparatively recent and concerted attempts to analyse the 
profound changes in Australian local government, like Dollery and Marshall’s 1997 
edited volume Australian Local Government: Reform and Renewal, are already 
dated. Accordingly, there appears to be an urgent need to review trends in local 
governments to keep pace with rapid ongoing development. This objective forms the 
subject matter of the present paper. 
The paper itself is divided into six main parts. The first section deals with the 
legislative reform program in Australian local government. The second section deals 
with competitive tendering, competitive neutrality and contracting out. The third 
section focuses on the question of structural reform and especially the explosive 
issue of amalgamation. The fourth section examines workplace reform whereas the 
fifth section discusses financial reform. The paper ends with a few brief concluding 
remarks. 
Legislative reform 
All state governments have either completed, or are in the process of completing, 
substantial reviews of their Local Government Acts. The direction and timing of the 
new Acts, and the tenure of existing legislation, vary across the states. In Victoria, a 
new Local Government Act was enacted in 1989, which replaced existing legislation 
dating back to 1958. Substantial amendments were subsequently made with the 
Local Government (Amendment) Act (1996) and the Local Government (Further 
Amendment) Act (1997). The former Act has the purpose of increasing council 
accountability requiring a statement of performance targets and attainment, whilst 
the latter Act serves to clarify the roles and powers of the chief executive officer in 
relation to establishment of an appropriate organisational structure and employment 
arrangements for council staff. In New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia 
and Tasmania, new Local Government Acts replaced existing legislation that had 
been unchanged since 1919, 1936, 1960, and 1962 respectively. Finally, working 
drafts of Bills for a revised Local Government Act are under consideration in South 
Australia. The legislation is intended to replace the existing Act dating from 1934. 
Whereas the states’ legislative reforms vary enormously in their content, they 
have several common features. Key amongst these are attempts to reform the 
“essential elements of council’s operations, to set out accountability mechanisms, 
and to reduce the detailed prescription [found in the previous legislation]” (Wensing, 
1997b, p. 91). The legislative changes also provide the necessary framework for the 
program of microeconomic reform found in the wider public sector, details of which 
will be examined in the next section. Moreover, the process of reform in some states 
has run parallel to reforms in planning systems and state planning statutes. In 
particular, these associated reforms have focused on the need to “strengthen both 
regional and local strategic planning in order to establish a better framework for 
decision making across the whole of government; the provision of essential 
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infrastructure and services; and the clearer definition of the respective roles of state 
and local governments” (Wensing, 1997b, p. 91). 
However, the primary purpose of legislative reform has been the generational, and 
sometimes even longer run, change in thinking about the role and functions of local 
government. Wensing (1997a; 1997b) argues that the previous Acts established 
prescriptive powers and functions that largely reflected state governments views that 
local government was a convenient administrative arrangement to which to delegate 
part of its functions. Moreover, “the overriding philosophy was one of regulation and 
stewardship of certain public assets, rather than ensuring that services were being 
provided to local communities in the most efficient and effective manner possible” 
(Wensing, 1997b, p. 90). However, there have also been modifications in the way in 
which local communities, and local government itself, think about the role and 
functions of local government. Wensing (1997b, p. 93) quotes a letter from a former 
Queensland Minister for Local Government outlining the new legislation:  
The present Local Government Act was introduced in 1936 when the 
principal focus of local government services was on providing basic 
community infrastructure and property related services. Almost 60 years on 
there is a growing expectation everywhere that councils should play a much 
greater role in the social, economic and environmental well-being of their 
communities. 
This is not to say that state specific stimuli did not exert an influence on the move to 
legislative reform. In Victoria, the changes associated with the new Local 
Government Act included the establishment of a Local Government Board, 
wholesale boundary changes, and the introduction of compulsory competitive 
tendering for the bulk of council services (National Office of Local Government, 
1997, p. 150). On the other hand, the process of reform in Queensland grew from the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry and the establishment of the Electoral and Administrative Review 
Commission (EARC) and the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) (Wensing, 1997a, 
1997b; Sproats, 1998).1 The first of these bodies was primarily concerned with 
electoral reform, open disclosure, review of boundaries and ethical conduct, while 
the second focused on personal and corporate accountability, control systems and 
audits and the public disclosure of interests.2 Finally, in Tasmania the existing 
legislation had been complicated by a large number of amendments and statutes 
detailing additional functions and powers, and the need arose to simplify and clarify 
their impact and interpretation (Wensing, 1997b). However, regardless of state-
specific issues, Wensing (1997a, p. 43) observed that:  
[I]n most states the changes to Local Government Acts have given councils 
general competence powers that enable them to do whatever is necessary to 
better meet local community needs and aspirations. The powers have been 
accompanied with changes to Planning Acts, giving councils much more 
responsibility for strategic planning in their local area.  
Competitive tendering, competitive neutrality and contracting out 
One requirement of the revised local legislation in most states was the need to 
establish a framework suitable for accommodating the commitment by local 
government to apply the competition principles outlined in the Competition 
Principles Agreement (CPA) of 1994, notwithstanding the fact that local government 
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is not a signatory to the Agreement.3 Although the need for brevity limits discussion 
of the CPA, the general principles entailed cover both the prohibition of commercial 
practices, such as price fixing, market sharing, resale price maintenance and third-
line forcing in the public sector, and the endorsement of the notion of competitive 
neutrality to ensure that there is no net advantage by government business enterprises 
over private sector competitors (that is, firms compete on their inherent strengths and 
weaknesses irrespective of ownership). The CPA also initiated the scrutiny of public 
monopolies to separate regulatory from commercial activities, to oversee monopoly 
pricing, and to review legislative restrictions on competition. Since most Australian 
local authorities retain monopolies over the delivery of many services and are often 
involved in commercial undertakings, there is an obvious need for their implied 
commitment to implement the competitive reforms entailed in the CPA.4  This has 
invoked a dramatic change in the way councils go about their business. Many 
councils have restructured by introducing a ‘provider/purchaser’ or ‘funder/provider’ 
split with staff designated as either ‘providers of goods and services’ or ‘purchasers 
of goods and services’ (Sproats, 1998). Still others have “lifted the restrictions as to 
how and to whom services and goods will be provided or how and from whom they 
will be purchased” (Sproats, 1998, p. 11). However, apart from the overall 
commitment to the CPA, the pace of adoption to these principles varies across states, 
so it is perhaps best to assess it within this framework. 
The pace of adoption of the principles entailed in the CPA has been most rapid in 
Victoria [see, for example, Victorian Local Government Board (1993)]. Under the 
auspices of the various Acts, targets for the introduction of compulsory competitive 
tendering, whereby agencies are required to introduce competitive tendering to 
specified services or a specified level of expenditure, and competitive neutrality have 
been mandated. For the former, compulsory targets for expenditure subject to 
competitive tender were set at 20 percent in 1994/95, 30 percent in 1995/96, and 50 
percent in 1996/97. Of Victoria’s 78 councils, some 88 percent met the 1995/96 
benchmark, with around 37 percent of aggregate operating expenditure (or $940 
million) subject to competitive tender. For the latter, councils were obliged to apply 
with competitively neutral pricing principles from July 1997. A pricing guide to help 
councils in implementing this policy was released in May 1997 (National Office of 
Local Government, 1997).  
In other states the reform process has been more gradual and pressures for the 
degree of prescription more subdued (National Office of Local Government, 1997, p. 
150). Kiss (1997, p. 51) has argued that this was not the case in Victoria, where the 
state government was “unconstrained by institutional or political barriers” due to the 
recent program of structural reform. In NSW, local government retains considerable 
flexibility and autonomy in applying competition policy.5 However, councils will be 
required to undertake some reforms in the way in which business activities are 
operated. For example, there is explicit reference to the power of the Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) to review the pricing practices of local 
government business activities that can be declared monopolies under the separate 
IPART legislation (New South Wales Government, 1997; IPART, 1998).6 In 
Queensland, the main emphasis in competition policy is on the significant business 
activities of larger urban councils. The policy likewise recognises the autonomy of 
local government by leaving the implementation of reforms in the hands of 
individual councils (Committee for the Economic Development of Australia 1996). 
On the other hand, Western Australia has focused on the costs and benefits of 
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restrictive legislation at the local level (National Office of Local Government, 1997, 
p. 157). Using a staged review process to the year 2000, local laws are reviewed to 
detail the costs and attendant benefits of lack of competition. A public benefit test is 
also being applied to large business activities.7 Competitive compulsory tendering 
has been ruled out by the Western Australia state government in the belief it is 
impractical in many of the state’s rural and remote areas. Finally, in Tasmania a 
timetable for the full cost attribution of all business activities was set in place. 
However, the program was suspended in light of the recent amalgamation process 
(National Office of Local Government, 1997, p. 159). 
Even before the CPA, the vast majority of Australian councils used competitive 
tendering in some form or another (Industry Commission, 1996, p. 63).8 For 
instance, in 1989 87 percent of councils contracted at least one service, with 52 
percent contracting out more than four. In NSW between 70 and 85 percent of 
councils used contracting for refuse collection, sanitation and road and bridge 
maintenance, and had already been doing so in 1988/89, compared to around 50 
percent in 1960/61. Studies suggest that by the early 1990s some 10 to 20 percent of 
total aggregate council expenditure was contracted out, without any degree of 
compulsion (Industry Commission, 1996, p. 63). In a 1990 survey, the Evatt 
Research Centre (1990) found the most commonly contracted services (with 
percentage of councils contracting out the selected service in brackets) to be: (i) 
recycling (60%), (ii) household garbage collection (55%), (iii) cleaning of 
kindergartens (42%), (iv) cleaning of community centres (35%), (v) drainage (21%), 
(vi) road, bridge and footpath maintenance (17%), (vii) operation of child care 
centres (5%), (viii) elderly care services (4%), and (ix) social workers (1%). More 
recent data is available on the Victorian local government experience under the first 
year of CCT. In 1994/95 over half of CCT expenditure was on public works and 
services (roads, drainage and public facilities), followed by approved purchasing 
schemes, environmental services (garbage collection, recycling and street cleaning), 
administrative and financial services, recreation facilities, and health and welfare 
services. However, there is some variance in the types of services contracted by 
councils. Studies have indicated that rural councils typically contract out 
professional services, such as valuation, engineering and planning services, whilst 
urban councils are more likely to contract out recycling, construction and road and 
building maintenance (Evatt Research Centre, 1990; Industry Commission, 1996). 
Evidence on the effects of compulsory competitive tendering and contracting out 
in Australian local government is also somewhat mixed. Of the Australian evidence, 
the Evatt Research Centre (1990: 62) concluded that “there is tentative evidence to 
suggest that lower cost may be achieved in many cases at the expense of service 
quality”. However, Aurlich (1997b) argued that the potential costs savings in CCT 
were not as large as expected due to transactions costs involved in implementing the 
reforms. A survey of Victorian local authorities found that nearly half of respondents 
had indicated that quality had improved with tendering, with only 22 percent 
suggesting it had not (National Office of Local Government, 1995). After reviewing 
a number of local government cases, the Industry Commission (1996, p. 156) 
concluded that “the available evidence on the cost impacts of CTC suggests that 
CTC has in the past provided substantial savings ... it is also clear that saving cannot 
be guaranteed in every case”. Furthermore, the Industry Commission (1996) found 
that whilst there was potential for some of the savings to derive from transfers, the 
greater proportion of documented savings was likely to come from efficiency gains. 
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The sources of efficiency gains cited include “improvements in management and 
work practices, wider access to skills, more efficient use of capital, stimulation of 
innovation and increased flexibility in service delivery” (Industry Commission, 
1996, p. 157).9 
The fact that the use of competitive compulsory tendering and contracting out has 
increased dramatically among Australian local governments is quite clear. However, 
the proposition that cost savings and improvements in service quality have occurred 
because of this process is less certain. Part of the problem resides in the nature of the 
markets in question – the degree of competition and contestability, agency costs 
required to clarify and specify standards of services, and to monitor the standards of 
services delivered, and benefits attributable to other reforms such as amalgamations 
– and part due to limitations in the empirical studies intended to measures the extent 
of efficiency gains.10  
Structural reform 
One of the most contentious features of Australian microeconomic reform has been 
the restructuring and amalgamation of local government areas (Sproats 1998).11 With 
the exception of New South Wales, all states have either completed, or are in the 
process of completing, structural adjustment during the period of the 1990s. 
Excluding NSW and Western Australia, where the numbers of councils have 
marginally risen (by 0.5 and 2.9 percent respectively), this has usually involved a 
reduction in the number of individual local government units in each state. In 
Victoria, the number of local government areas has fallen by 62.8 percent since 
1990, with reductions of 6.7 percent in Queensland, 41.8 percent in South Australia, 
and 36.9 percent in Tasmania over the same period (see Table I). And with rare 
exceptions, the process of structural reform has been instigated by the state 
governments, and most often in the context of the financial, legislative and corporate 
governance reforms advanced over the same period.12 
State 1910 1918 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1991 1993 1997 
NSW 324 320 319 299 289 230 244 205 176 178 177 
Vic. 206 190 195 196 197 205 210 211 210 205 78 
Qld. 164 173 152 144 144 133 131 131 134 132 125 
SA 175 184 196 142 143 143 142 132 122 119 71 
WA 147 141 147 148 148 147 144 138 138 139 142 
Tas. 51 50 49 49 49 49 49 49 46 29 29 
NT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 7 
Total 1067 1058 1058 978 970 907 900 866 826 701 629 
Table I.  
Trends in the number of 
Australian local 
governments,  
1910–97 
Sources: ABS Commonwealth Year Books, Commonwealth Office of Local 
Government Financial Assistance Database.  
Notes: Totals exclude the 100 Community, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
and other local governing bodies receiving Commonwealth Financial Assistance 
Grants – 62 in the Northern Territory, 31 in Queensland, 6 in South Australia and 
one in NSW; N/A – not applicable. 
Although the objectives and modus operandi of state-based structural reform vary 
enormously, a common core of social, political and economic conditions underlie the 
spate of recent amalgamations. The first set of conditions that has been advanced is 
standard public finance arguments for consolidation. Starting with the economic 
theory of ‘fiscal federalism’ (the division of taxation and expenditure powers among 
different levels of government comprising a federation), the ‘correspondence 
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principle’ holds that the size of a particular government should correspond to the 
‘benefit region’ or the area of the benefit flowing from the goods it provides to 
citizens (Dollery, 1997). This ‘benefit region’ is likely to vary with the type of public 
good provided, and will accordingly correspond to particular levels of government. 
Dollery (1997, p.449) has argued that: 
Thus, services which are nationwide in their benefit incidence (like defence 
forces) should be provided nationally; services with regional benefits (such as 
highway systems) should be provided regionally; and services with local 
benefits (like streetlights and pavements) should be provided locally.  
This notion of a benefit region therefore provides the concept of an optimal 
community size in the provision of local public services. Pressures for consolidation 
may therefore arise on the basis that these benefit regions extend or ‘spillover’ into 
the jurisdictions of adjacent local councils, combined with arguments concerning the 
economies of scale and scope resulting from large multifunctional jurisdictions.  
However, such spillovers do not necessarily provide an argument for amalgamation, 
the primary limitation being that local public services vary greatly in their economic 
characteristics, like economies of scale and benefit regions. Dollery (1997, p. 450) 
has concluded that: 
[I]t is highly unlikely that the optimal service district for fire protection 
services will coincide, or even resemble, optimal service districts for, say, 
refuse collection, public parks, or sewerage treatment works. It follows on 
theoretical grounds that a single common service district for even a relatively 
small number of local public services resulting from the amalgamation of 
small councils may not be efficient, even if any positive gains in 
administrative efficiency are included.  
A number of reports have been completed using at least some of these arguments. 
For example, the IPART (1998, p. 50) interim report received a number of 
submissions suggesting that economies of scope exist for a range of services 
typically provided by councils. Examples include the grouping of water and 
sewerage, as well as the grouping of planning, building, and economic development 
functions. In a recent review of the empirical evidence on economies of scale in 
Australian local government, Byrnes and Dollery (2001) have argued that although 
the preponderance of evidence appears to suggest the existence of economies of scale 
in many Australian municipal services, the methodologies adopted in most of the 
extant empirical studies leave much to be desired. Similarly, submissions to the 
Tribunal generally supported the existence of economies of scale in the provision of 
local government services. Some of these suggested that the viable size for local 
government units in high population density areas ranges from 50,000–240,000 
residents. Other submissions concluded that the most economical size of council is 
around 250,000 constituents (IPART, 1998, p. 51). The presence of these effects in 
the context of Australian local government has been disputed by a number of authors 
[see, for instance, Abelson (1981), Jones (1995) Tucker (1997) and Vince 1997]. 
Some of these writers also discuss possible alternatives to amalgamations, including 
inter-authority contracting (Jones, 1995; Vince, 1997), informal staff and equipment 
substitution (Vince, 1997), resource sharing (Dollery, 1997), special purpose joint 
authorities, local area integration, and so on.  
 8 
The second set of conditions largely relate to the specific context within which 
Australian local government operates. Certainly major changes to the demography, 
employment and infrastructure of local government areas has meant that many 
geographically-based boundaries are increasingly anachronistic (Vince, 1997). 
Advances in technology and transportation also mean that larger local government 
units are theoretically feasible (Jones 1993). And the changing nature of Australian 
society has increased community demands and expectations of local government to 
provide a wider range of community facilities and human-related services (Vince, 
1997). Apart from these a large number of other factors contributing to the pressures 
for amalgamation in Australia have been proposed. They include desire for 
administrative simplicity deriving from a smaller number of councils by the state; 
bureaucratic attempts at maximising perquisites in larger councils; lowers costs of 
representation; access to more diverse funding bases; and public choice models of 
behaviour by both federal and state politicians [see, for example, Jones (1995), Smith 
(1996), Vince (1997), Dollery (1997) and Sproats (1998)].  
The evidence supporting both sets of arguments has benefited from the increase in 
fiscal transparency and accountability provided by the raft of recent legislative and 
financial reforms. The shift in legislative emphasis from a regulatory to an enabling 
role, and the increase in accountability and transparency provided by financial 
reform, has provided a suitable background to amalgamation. Moreover, increased 
scrutiny of state grant organisations (upon whose grants councils rely to a greater or 
lesser extent) has served to intensify the pressures for consolidation by quantifying 
the external costs of inefficient councils in a system of intergovernmental grants. 
However, many of the circumstances contributing to amalgamations derive from 
particular state/local relations, and it is to the structural reform process in each state 
that discussion will now turn. 
Boundary reform has been fastest and most dramatic in Victoria (Chapman, 
1997b; Sproats, 1998). However, the background to the most recent restructure dates 
at least to the 1962 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Local Government 
which focused attention on the issue of boundary alterations and local authority 
mergers (Kiss, 1997). In the 1970s, amalgamation efforts tended to concentrate on 
large urban concentrations. For example, in 1972 the Local Government Advisory 
Board (LGAB) recommended the amalgamation of the cities of Melbourne, Fitzroy, 
South Melbourne and Port Melbourne, and a similar 1979 report advocated a single 
authority for Geelong. Both recommendations were rejected by the state government. 
However, an important catalyst for structural change was presented by the Water and 
Sewerage Authorities (Restructuring) Act 1983 which reduced the number of such 
bodies across Victoria from 350 to 140. In a number of rural areas local government 
authorities took up the operations of the amalgamated water and sewage authorities.  
Finally, in late 1985 the Report by the Victoria Grants Commission on the 
Prospective Financial Advantages of Restructuring Local Government in Victoria 
conducted a statistical analysis of economies of scale in Victorian councils and 
predicted a financial crisis in some smaller councils. A subsequent report entitled 
The Restructure of Local Government in Victoria: Principles and Programme on 
implementing structural reform in 1985/86, which would have reduced the number of 
individual councils by about half, was not carried through due to political pressure at 
the state level and popular protests against amalgamation (Jones, 1995; Vince, 1997). 
However, the general tenor of these recommendations was embodied in the Victorian 
legislative reforms discussed earlier which carried provision for the establishment of 
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a Local Government Board to review the structure of local government. Hallam 
(1994) has argued that whilst the Board commenced with no set reduction target, the 
state government “made no secret of its desire to substantially reduce the number of 
councils in Victoria”. The number of councils was reduced from 210 to 78 over the 
period August 1993 to February 1995, a process which nearly doubled the average 
population of metropolitan councils from 57 000 to about 100 000, and was expected 
to deliver rate savings of some $300 million. Savings of $249 million eventuated in 
the restructured system in the first year (Hallam, 1995), but at the expense of labour 
and management problems, difficulties with integrating administrative and financial 
systems, and some degree of asset duplication and community dissatisfaction (Kiss 
1997; Vince 1997).  
In Tasmania, pressures for structural reform had been felt since at least 1907 
when the Report of the Commission Established by the Local Government Act 
reduced the number of councils from 149 to 53.  In a series of additional reports, the 
Royal Commission on Local Government 1939, Report of Select Committee of House 
Assembly 1961, and the Report of the Tasmanian Municipal Commission 1965, 
recommendations were made to reduce the number of councils significantly. These 
were all unsuccessful due to “legal or political reasons” (Sproats, 1998, p. 4). 
However, the 1992 Inquiry into the Modernisation of Local Government did succeed 
because “the Tasmanian state and the majority of local governments jointly pursued 
genuine reform of the local government system” (Vince, 1997, p. 160). The report 
recommended that because of the low, and in some areas, negative growth potential, 
“the best means of providing the opportunity for the advantages of economies of 
scale to be taken is for the capacity of these areas to be enhanced by the creation of 
new larger authorities through mergers” (Local Government Advisory Board, 1992, 
p. 5). However, whereas Tasmanian structural reform has been as comprehensive as 
that found in Victoria, it has been pursued in “a much more co-operative atmosphere 
and over a longer period of time” (Chapman, 1997b, p. 15). Vince (1997, p. 161) has 
argued that the Tasmanian experience of structural reform succeeded because of the 
willingness of existing councils to be involved in the reform process, the offer of the 
state government to fund transitional costs arising from the process of amalgamation, 
and the willingness of elected councillors to be involved in the process (albeit under 
the threat of an appointed commissioner, as in the case of Victoria). 
South Australia experienced a steady decline in the number of local councils until 
the late 1980s. A 1988 report entitled Scale Economies in South Australian Local 
Government, found that savings could be made if large-scale amalgamations were 
enacted. Jones (1995) argued that this report, which was also used as the basis for the 
Tasmanian inquiries, was based on faulty methodology which introduced biases 
against non-metropolitan areas by failing to adjust for differences in administrative 
costs across population densities. In October 1994, a Ministerial Advisory Group on 
Local Government Reform was established with terms of reference covering roles 
and functions, performance and benchmarking, competitive tendering, structural 
arrangements, and incentives for amalgamation. However, its report on structural 
reform emphasised the desirability of voluntarism, with a target number of 34 
councils (from 118). Ostensibly to overcome a backlog in the pace of such voluntary 
restructuring, the Local Government Reform Board (LGRB) was established to 
oversee the amalgamation process, initiate its own proposals for amalgamations, 
respond to initiatives taken by councils, and provide financial incentives (Sproats, 
1998, p. 5). The number of councils was reduced from 118 to 69, and the number of 
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elected members from 1100 to 700 by the May 1997 elections. Total recurrent 
savings to date are estimated at $20 million (with $13 million among metropolitan 
councils and $6.3 million among rural councils) or about 8 percent of rate revenue. 
By contrast, the process of recent structural reform in Queensland is interesting 
for at least two reasons. Firstly, in 1925 Australia’s largest municipality, Brisbane 
City Council, was created from an amalgam of nineteen local government areas. This 
still represents the only Australian capital city under the control of a single local 
government [a continuation of what Tucker (1997) refers to as an overall 
‘greaterisation’ program in the 1910s]. The second reason for interest is that whereas 
some boundary reforms had been subsequently implemented, the immediate catalyst 
for the recent round of structural reform was not financial. As discussed in the earlier 
section on legislative reform, the Fitgerald Inquiry’s recommendations for the 
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) and the Electoral and Administrative Review 
Commission (EARC) had created a general climate of change in boundaries in 
Queensland. In 1993/94 Queensland’s Office of the Local Government 
Commissioner estimated that the merger of sixteen councils into seven – Gold Coast, 
Ipswich, Burnett, Mackay, Cairns, Warwick and Cooloola – would save $9.4 million 
or 6.1 percent of the rate base. With few exceptions, these largely included the 
amalgamation of large regional centres and their hinterlands: for example, Gold 
Coast and Albert councils, Cairns and Mulgrave, and Ipswich and Morton. These 
amalgamation proposals were largely based on views about communities of interest, 
urban overspill into rural areas, and improved infrastructure (Sproats, 1998; Tucker, 
1997). 
Finally, in NSW and Western Australia the process of structural reform has been 
somewhat more subdued. In the case of NSW this is largely due to an earlier series 
of reforms that reduced the number of councils by more than 50 percent since 
Federation. For example, a round of amalgamations in the 1970s substantially 
decreased the number of non-metropolitan councils by amalgamating 34 regional 
urban municipalities and surrounding rural shires into 15 larger bodies. In common 
with South Australia, the state government has stressed the importance of voluntary 
amalgamations, although additional voices were raised. For example, the New South 
Wales Government Commission of Inquiry (2001) has recommended that the 
structure of local government in the inner city and eastern suburbs of Sydney 
(currently Botany Bay, Leichardt, Marrickville, Randwick, South Sydney, Sydney, 
Waverley and Woollahra) be recast by the creation of four new councils (an 
enhanced City of Sydney, a mixed residential/industrial city, a beachside/harbourside 
residential city and an inner West residential Gateway city). More broadly, the 
Building Owners and Managers Association has called for the amalgamation of 
around 45 Sydney municipalities into 14 ‘super councils’ and a separate council for 
the Sydney CBD. In addition, the NSW Local Government and Shires’ Association 
has developed a Local Government Development Program (LGDP) which provides 
councils with facilitators to assess the net benefits of co-operative service provision, 
resource sharing, joint service delivery enterprises, boundary change and 
amalgamation. However, considering NSW local governments’ long history of 
regional voluntary co-operation (i.e. Regional Organisation of Councils (ROC), 
initiatives such as the latter are unlikely to be felt in radical structural change 
(Chapman, 1997b).13 
In Western Australia, structural reform is a focus of interest for the Local 
Government Structural Reform Advisory Committee (SRAC). Topics for discussion 
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included issues relating to representation, community interest, financial 
considerations, comparative service costs and economies of scale, benchmarks and 
best-practice, co-operative arrangement and resource sharing. In its report, the SRAC 
(1996, p. iv) noted that while there was “scope for some rationalisation of 
boundaries, there is no justification for a wholesale Government-driven agenda of 
local government amalgamations”. The Committee reasoned that Western Australian 
councils generally have low levels of administration per capita, low levels of debt 
and a relatively high degree of financial self-sufficiency, although this varied by 
locality. However, the report (SRAC, 1996, p. viii) also urged councils: 
[T]hat fail to meet more than one of the three viability criteria – where 
administration expenditure is more than 10 percent of expenditure; where 
debt service [is] more than 33 percent of rate income; and financial assistance 
grants [are] more than 50 percent of total income – [to] make a close 
examination of their viability, operations and options for structural reform.  
The SRAC Report compared the administrative costs of 84 councils in the wheat-belt 
and south-west of the state with a grouping into 26 units, as well as benchmarking 
metropolitan councils. Notional annual savings were reckoned to be from around 
$8.5 to $21.4 million in rural areas with a further $15.8 to $53 million in urban areas. 
Currently the Local Government Advisory Board is examining the preliminary 
feasibility of ‘doughnut’ amalgamations (regional centre councils with their 
surrounding shires) in Albany, Bunbury, Geraldton, Northam, Mandurah and 
Narrogin. 
Accordingly, the pressure for structural reform in Australian local government, 
despite being sporadic, is pervasive. The process has intensified during the 1990s in 
association with the general program of legislative and microeconomic reform, and 
cannot be divorced from the pressures for accountability, transparency, effectiveness 
and efficiency found in this program. Pressures for reform have relaxed somewhat in 
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania after what have been some eighty to ninety 
years of imperviousness to reports calling for structural change. Of the remaining 
states, pressure would appear to be strongest in Western Australia where local 
government jurisdictions per unit of area and population are clearly inconsistent with 
the other states. For example, Western Australia covers a third of the continent, has 
23 percent of Australia’s councils, and only 9.6 percent of Australia’s total 
population. However, amalgamations are unlikely to be viable for sparsely populated 
councils in remote areas of Western Australia, and in the case of north-western 
NSW, western Queensland, and the Northern Territory. Nevertheless, the history of 
structural reform in Australia has shown that objective rationale are not the sole 
determinants of amalgamations, and any future structural changes must be examined 
in light of state/local relations, amongst other factors. 
A number of themes emerge from the process of structural reform in Australian 
local government. First, in all states a critical factor underlying structural reform has 
been purported economies of scale. This theme has been extensively promoted in the 
Victorian reform process (Sproats, 1997; Vince, 1997). However, although much of 
the literature is ambivalent about the benefits to be gained from mergers, some 
commentators suggest that “economies of scale in administrative costs may be 
achieved up to a certain point, though there is disagreement over when the point of 
diminishing returns is reached” (Witherby et al., 1997, p. 118). Similarly, it is 
contended that economies of scale may vary across the range of services provided at 
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the local level. For example, Travers, Jones and Burnham (1993, p. 54) concluded 
that: 
Larger authorities were, for some services or parts of services, apparently 
able to secure provision at lower costs than smaller ones, while in other 
services, smaller authorities appeared more cost-effective. In short, size may 
matter for some services or parts of services, but not in a way which 
systematically answered the question ‘what is the right-size of authority to 
provide a particular service?’. 
 A second theme is the concept of ‘communities of interest’ that has been widely 
used by state inquiries in the course of their deliberations. Although advocated in a 
number of inquiries, especially in Queensland, Witherby et al. (1997, p. 119) have 
argued that its validity is questionable “since it is always possible to discover 
communities of interest that conform to preferred boundary reforms”. The final 
theme is the relative lack of attention directed to alternatives to amalgamations in 
structural inquiries (Vince 1997). For example, only in a small number of states has 
the concept of ‘resource sharing’ been widely promoted during recent reforms 
(Witherby et al., 1997; Dollery, 1997) (see, for instance, Western Australia, and to a 
lesser extent, Queensland) and only in NSW has regional co-operation been 
universally adopted. 
Workplace reform 
In so far as the pressure for workplace reform in local government can be isolated 
from the overall program of microeconomic reform in the Australian public sector, 
the primary impetus for workplace reform was the 1989 National Review of Local 
Government Labour Markets (NRLGLM) (Sproats, 1998). The major aims of this 
review were: (i) to recommend steps to improve the supply of skilled labour to meet 
the needs of local government; and (ii) to identify ways in which local government 
can improve its employment practices so that there are better career opportunities, 
more meaningful and rewarding jobs and higher productivity. The review concluded 
that there were a range of barriers preventing employment flexibility and efficient 
personnel management in local government. Key issues identified by the review 
included: (i) lack of training opportunities and a planned approach to human resource 
development; (ii) outmoded recruitment, staff development and equal employment 
opportunity practices; (iii) inappropriate internal organisation structures within local 
government; (iv) few clear career paths due to a large range of job classifications and 
barrier preventing internal mobility; (v) lack of portability of superannuation and 
other benefits; and (vi) government regulation of occupations, in particular, 
legislative requirements for statutory positions.   
Martin (1997, p. 217) argued that the review had two main effects on the process 
of workplace reform in local government. First, it “legitimised action by state 
departments of local government for developing strategies [concerning] human 
resource development, recruitment and staff development processes ... [and] 
determining new ways of designing local government organisations away from 
professional or occupationally-based structures” (Martin, 1997, p. 217). For 
example, in NSW where the pace of workplace reform has been fastest, a new four-
level award for local government employees based on skill categories replaced six 
existing awards focused on job classifications. Second, Martin (1997, p. 217) has 
argued that the review of local government labour markets “represents the last 
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national attempt to develop an industry level, strategic approach to human resource 
management”. The strategic intent set out in this plan, and as agreed by all state and 
territory ministers for local government, provides a benchmark with which to assess 
the extent of workplace reform in local government. 
The deregulation of local government labour markets has been evidenced in a 
number of additional ways. Firstly, many restrictive employment strategies have 
been removed (Sproats, 1998). For example, managerial positions in local 
government are increasingly available to professionals other than those previously 
prescribed in regulated statutory positions (i.e. town clerk, engineer, planner, health 
surveyor). This has meant an increase in cross-disciplinary employment within local 
government, and an increase in the number of CEOs from the private sector taking 
up positions in local government. However, “at this stage the shift has not been 
widespread and some of the new CEOs have stayed for only one term” (Sproats, 
1998, p. 10). Secondly, the tenure of local government employees has changed. For 
example, in NSW senior management staff must be employed under contract with 
maximum length of five years. Sproats (1998, p. 11) has observed that this represents 
a particularly “steep learning curve for many senior local government staff used to 
long-term job security”.14    
Financial reform 
The final major trend in Australian local government is the process of financial 
reform. Efforts aimed at financial reform have primarily focused on the 
implementation of the external reporting requirements of the Australian Accounting 
Standard AAS27 Financial Reporting by Local Government (1990). This standard 
was ostensibly introduced to allow local governments to move from a heavily 
regulated reporting system, based on traditional fund accounting, which emphasised 
cash flows, to a more business-orientated approach based on accrual accounting. 
Goyne (1993) and Thompson (1994) provide a detailed review of the revised system. 
The new approach requires councils to value all assets, account for potential 
expenditures and liabilities, provide for depreciation charges, and accrue adequate 
funds for the maintenance of assets (NOLG, 1992). This has involved councils in 
identifying, classifying, assessing, and valuing all community infrastructure and 
resources. It has been argued that the implementation of AAS27 will: (i) meet the 
requirements of an expanded concept of accountability (as specified in the general 
program of microeconomic reform); (ii) result in effective asset management; and 
(iii) provide meaningful information on the full cost of a council’s individual 
activities and programs (Bishop, 1997, p. 174). For example, in NSW councils are 
now required “to report on the condition of physical assets, gaps between that and 
satisfactory levels, how the gaps will be bridged, and how the assets will be 
maintained at the satisfactory level” (Sproats, 1998, p. 13). However, apart from the 
well-known limitations of accrual accounting, it has also been argued that process of 
financial reform and the stated objective of enhancing accountability is largely 
incomplete even under AAS27; that is, until concerted efforts are made to more fully 
investigate financial management practices and management accounting processes in 
local government (Bishop, 1997, p. 188).  
Concluding remarks 
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that Australian government is still in 
the throes of ongoing and fundamental change (Dollery and Wallis, 2001). Much of 
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this change appears to be of the “top-down” variety, chiefly instigated by state 
governments but also with strong Commonwealth government encouragement. 
Despite the pervasiveness of this reform process in terms of the functions of local 
government, and insofar as it continues apace in all states and territories, it can be 
argued that in some respects its application is uneven. For example, whereas 
Victorian local government has undergone massive compulsory consolidation with a 
concomitant drastic reduction in the number of councils, the process of 
amalgamation in NSW is still voluntary with much greater autonomy for individual 
local authorities, and very little consolidation has taken place. Similar differences in 
the application of reform programs to other areas of local government activity, such 
as workplace reform, are also apparent between the states and territories. Whether 
the myriad of reform initiatives achieves their intended objectives of accountability, 
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness remains to be seen, despite several 
favourable early indications. 
 
Notes 
1.  Tucker (1997, p. 92) contends that Wensing’s (1997a; 1997b) suggestion that 
the catalyst for the overhaul of Queensland local government legislation was 
the EARC and CJC is incorrect, since work on these projects commenced 
some two years before the parent Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
2.  The NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) also includes 
the operation of local government in its terms of reference. 
3.  The parties to the Competition Principles Agreement (1994) are the 
Commonwealth, and the six state and two territory governments. Under 
Section 7(1) of the Agreement, the principles set out in the Agreement will 
apply to local government, with each State and Territory Party being 
responsible for the application of these principles. 
4.  Competitive compulsory tendering is not just an Australian phenomenon. 
Moves to implement CTC in local government internationally are most 
advanced in New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In New Zealand, local 
authorities were able to provide their services through companies, 
partnerships, trust and incorporated societies to provide services on a 
commercial footing. In order to receive road subsidies local authorities were 
also required to apply competitive pricing procedures through a separately 
constituted internal business unit, a local authority trading enterprise, or a 
private contractor. In the United Kingdom, CCT principles have been applied 
in local authorities since 1980. Initially only applied to a proportion of 
construction and maintenance work, CCT provisions were extended in 1988 
to include garbage collection, street and building cleaning, vehicle and 
building maintenance, and the management of sport and recreation facilities. 
The new provisions also addressed anti-competitive behaviour, preventing the 
restriction, distortion, or prevention of competition when preparing contract 
specifications or awarding a contract.  
5.  In its original policy statement, the NSW Government (1997, p. 82) indicated 
that it “has no plans to apply the principals of structural reform to local 
government, beyond those measures that are integral to the application of 
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competitive neutrality”.  In regards to the CPA’s provisions for third party 
access to essential infrastructure, the NSW Government (1997, p. 83) has also 
noted “to date, no local councils appear to own or operate services that 
require the application of a State based access regime. As such, their services 
will be subject to the generic regime in Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act”. 
6.  The Tribunal (IPART, 1998, p. 62) concluded, “some of the business and 
commercial activities undertaken by council (e.g. saleyards, caravan parks, 
airports, showgrounds, land development) may entail significantly greater 
risk than ‘core’ activities such as planning, road maintenance and waste 
disposal. In the Tribunal’s view, councils should specify a clear objective and 
performance indicators for each activity. Commercial activities should be 
accounted for separately from other council activities (‘ringfencing’)”. 
7.  Most states have urged councils to separate their activities into two 
categories. The first category requires the imposition of taxes or tax 
equivalents, debt guarantee fees, compliance with regulations, or 
corporatisation where appropriate. The second category requires full cost 
attribution for significant businesses with a broad range of activities. To 
separate these two categories, most state governments have used turnover 
thresholds for council business activities. In NSW the turnover threshold is 
$2 million,  $5 million in Queensland and $2 million in South Australia (or 
employing assets in excess of $20 million). In Victoria, corporatisation of 
business activities is considered for those entities with annual revenue of at 
least $10 million or a workforce of at least 15, with full cost attribution of all 
other activities. In Western Australia, entities with turnover in excess of 
$200,000 are to be considered for either full cost attribution or 
corporatisation, whilst Tasmania has not yet established any thresholds. 
8.  In the U.K. about £3 billion of local authority expenditure was contracted in 
1986/87, rising to £6 billion under CCT in 1993. In the U.S., some $US100 
billion in local government was contracted out in 1987 or some 27 percent of 
total municipal services (Industry Commission, 1996, p. 60).  
9.  The Industry Commission (1996) also addressed the possible deleterious 
effects of CTC on local, especially rural, communities. Possible adverse 
effects included the loss of employment and income in the region, a transfer 
out of the region of local government resources, the replacement of a public 
monopoly with a private sector one, and a reduction in the flexibility of the 
delivery of services.  In order to minimise the subsidisation of external 
taxpayers to such a region, to provide clarity in the cost of local preferences 
to itself, and to ensure confidence of bidders in the probity of the tender 
process, it was recommended that all tender documentation should include 
preferences for contractors to employ local resources and the additional cost 
involved in using such resources (Industry Commission, 1996, p. 218).  
10.  One major problem is that much of the available data includes expenditure 
under non-competitively tendered contracts. The Industry Commission uses 
the term ‘contracting’ to refer to all contracts for service provision, both 
competitively tendered and non-competitively tendered. 
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11.  A number of other countries have also undertaken structural reforms of local 
government. In the period 1988 to 1989, New Zealand reduced the number of 
local government units from 741 (including 500 single purpose bodies) to 87 
new authorities. In the U.K., which was to become the intellectual inspiration 
for amalgamation movements in Australia and New Zealand, over 1300 local 
authorities were reduced to about 400 in the mid-1970s.  
12.  Despite the states being the primary movers for structural reform, the 
Commonwealth is providing over $1.25 million under the Local Government 
Development Plan (LGDP) to help states foster council amalgamations and 
facilitate other restructuring initiatives. Funds allocated to date include 
$400,000 to South Australia, $250,000 to Western Australia, $400,000 to 
New South Wales, and $220,000 to Tasmania. 
13.  In February 1997 a discussion paper entitled “Proposals to Encourage 
Regional Co-operation between Local Government Authorities in NSW” was 
released by the NSW Department of Local Government (NSWDLG). This 
paper encompassed 18 proposals concerning the key themes of recognition, 
facilitation and implementation of regional co-operative arrangements, 
including the recognition of Regional Organisations of Councils (ROCs) in 
the Local Government Act (1993) (NSWDLG, 1997).  
14.  There has been some media interest and general comment on the number of 
general managers in NSW leaving their positions and a suggestion that this 
represents some form of crisis or problem in local council administration. 
Prior to the introduction of the 1993 Local Government Act, the Chief 
Administrative Officer was the Town/Shire Clerk, who had security of tenure 
and special qualifications under the then Ordinance 4. With the 1993 Act 
came contract employment the abolition of special entry requirements, a 
revised role and powers to control day to day management of council 
operations (NSWDLG, 1997). The most recent NSW Department of Local 
Government Annual Report (1997: 37) examined the issue of council CEO 
turnover and argued that the annualised rate of 10.95 percent over the period 
1995 to 1997 was “not unusual”. The NSWDLG (1997, p. 37) concluded that: 
Examining individual cases showed a variety of reasons for changes in General 
Managers including death, retirement, promotion, better opportunities as well as the 
inability of some to cope with change. In a limited number of cases poor 
performance and personality conflicts have been the key factors. Initial placement 
through the recruitment process could have been more effective in some of these 
cases.  
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